Although China lags behind other liberalized aviation markets in low cost carrier (LCC) development, its largest LCC, Spring Airlines, has achieved rapid growth in traffic volume and revenue, as well as consistent profitability, since its inauguration in 2005. Our empirical study on the Chinese domestic market suggests that Spring adopts a "cream skimming" strategy to enter high-priced routes, allowing the carrier to achieve both a very high load factor and considerable profitability. Spring's capacity and market share on individual routes are constrained to low levels, likely due to government regulation and/or a "puppy dog" strategy adopted by the carrier. As a result, Spring is able to achieve fast growth without triggering price wars. To incumbent full service carriers, high speed rail (HSR) services impose much more significant competitive pressure than low cost carriers. Similar to LCCs in developed markets, Spring prefers to serve markets with high traffic volumes out of its operational base in Shanghai. Overall, Spring's entry decision is not significantly affected by competition, either from full service airlines or HSR services. Our investigation suggests that LCCs have potential to introduce more competition but are yet to be a "game changer" in China. further deregulation of the domestic market is needed.
Introduction
The Chinese aviation industry has experienced rapid growth during recent decades. The number of air passengers grew at an annualized rate of 14. 9% between 1990 9% between and 2010 9% between (CAAC 2012 , and since 2005 China has been the world's second largest aviation market in terms of scheduled capacity. Despite such phenomenal growth, some legacy regulations remain untouched and the aviation market exhibits some distinctive characteristics in terms of network configuration, inter-modal competition, airline cost competitiveness and profitability (Zhang and Chen 2003; Pan et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2009; Lei and O'Connell, 2011; Fu et al., 2012; Lau et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014a Wang et al., , 2014b . Among others, one puzzling feature is the extremely low penetration rate of low cost carriers (LCCs). As of June 2013, there is only one LCC, the Shanghai-based Spring Airlines, serving the domestic market.
Although Spring has been consistently profitable since its establishment, it has not brought about the significant fare reduction and traffic volume increase triggered by successful LCCs in deregulated markets. After several years' development, the LCC sector accounts for less than 3% of the Chinese domestic market, with no new entrant LCCs 1 . There has not yet been a clear explanation for the under-development of the LCC market in China, despite the success of Spring Airlines.
Both facilitating and impedimentary factors for LCC growth can be found in China. On the positive side, the market for tourists and so-called "visiting friends and relatives" (VFR) travelers has grown rapidly due to strong economic growth and an increasing middle class population in China. 2 Leisure passengers accounted for about half of the Chinese aviation 1 China West Air, a subsidiary of the Hainan Airline Group based in Chongqing, has announced its intention to transform into a low-cost carrier (CAPA report in July 2013, http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/hnas-chinawest-air-to-become-a-low-cost-carrier--the-catalyst-for-a-lcc-boom-in-china-117061). During our interviews with senior executives of the airline in Sep 2012, we learned that the airline had been profitable, with load factors generally above 90%. (Zhang and Round, 2008, 2011) . These changes should facilitate the entry of LCCs into the Chinese aviation market and improve their competitiveness.
< Figure 1 here > 3 Currently, only Shanghai is served by two airports. The cities of Beijing and Chengdu are building their second airports. In China's "12th Five-Year Plan for China Civil Aviation Development", CAAC (2011) decided that priority would be given to capacity expansions at hub airports and building new feeder airports. 4 Li et al. (2010) noted that instead of approving substantial regulatory changes all at once, some regulators adopted a progressive liberalization strategy by removing various restrictions gradually, or progressively increasing the upper limits on number of destinations and number of airlines into the markets. It appears that China has largely followed such a strategy. For example, China revised its Bilateral Service Agreement (BSA) with the US in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2007 respectively without committing any (full) open-skies agreements. For more discussions on the liberalization process of China, please refer to Zhang and Chen (2003) , O'Connell (2011), and Fu et al. (2014) .
However, LCCs may face some explicit and implicit impediments in serving the market. The
Chinese aviation market is very concentrated, with the top 10 airports accounting for approximately half of the domestic market in terms of scheduled capacity (Fu et al., 2012) .
Most of these large airports are experiencing capacity shortages, making it difficult for new airlines to get desired slots. In addition, airlines still face some constraints in aircraft purchase and pilot recruitment. Li and Zheng (2008) concluded that 80% of the costs incurred by
Chinese airlines are uncontrollable, because the fuel supply, airport charges and taxes are all regulated. There may be limited room for an airline to reduce its operating costs substantially.
Finally, although many Asian LCCs have aggressively expanded into international markets (Homsombat et al., 2011 (Homsombat et al., , 2014 , China is conservative in aviation liberalization and it has been quite challenging for private airlines to serve international destinations (Fu et al., 2010 , Adler et al., 2014 . In summary, there are both positive and negative factors influencing LCC development in China, but no study has yet provided a convincing explanation for the paradox of the stagnant LCC development in China despite the sustained profitability of Spring Airlines.
Numerous studies have been carried out on LCCs in developed countries where aviation markets are fully deregulated. The effects that LCCs have on pricing have been well documented. In general, competition from LCCs lowers the FSC prices on a route substantially and stimulates significant traffic volumes on the route and in adjacent markets (Whinston and Collins, 1992; Dresner, 1995, 1999; Dresner et al., 1996; Richards, 1996; Morrison, 2001; Hofer et al., 2008) . Morrison (2001) estimated that Southwest, the largest LCC in North America, saved U.S. air passengers US$12.9 billion in 1998, equivalent to 20% of the revenue for the domestic passenger market. Boguslaski et al. (2004) examined Southwest's route entry during 1990-2000 and confirmed that the airline was more likely to enter dense routes and to target low income and leisure passengers. Southwest avoided operating at other FSCs' hub airports and tended to expand its network from airports where it already provided services, with a preference for short-to medium-haul routes. Oliveira (2008) investigated the entry pattern of Gol, Brazil's most successful LCC. His study concluded that at an early stage, Gol adopted an entry strategy similar to that of Southwest to enter short haul and dense markets. Over time, however, Gol added more long-haul routes into its network. Fu et al. (2011) estimated an almost ideal demand system (AIDS) for passenger services out of Chicago. Their estimation confirmed that there is significant product differentiation between FSCs and LCCs and that an airline's fares are sensitive to competition from carriers of the same type (i.e. LCC pricing is more sensitive to competition from other LCCs than from FSCs).
If the results obtained from these studies can be directly applied to the Chinese aviation market, one would expect intense price competition between LCCs and FSCs, especially on dense, short-distance routes linking secondary airports. This should lead to a high penetration rate of LCC services in the leisure market. However, as described in Section 2 below, this is not what has been observed in the Chinese aviation market. Such a discrepancy between theoretical prediction and actual market outcome calls for an empirical investigation into LCC development in China. Therefore, this study aims to assess Spring's effects on pricing and to investigate its route entry pattern. The contribution of this study to the literature is two-fold.
It complements LCC studies in developed markets and helps us to better understand LCC operation and competition. It also provides much needed insight into the Chinese aviation market and assists policy-makers in creating effective strategies to promote industry growth.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general background of Spring Airlines and relevant policy developments in the Chinese domestic markets. In Section 3, reduced form fare equations are estimated to identify Spring's pricing strategy and competitive effects on incumbent FSCs. Section 4 examines Spring's route entry pattern, and the last section summarizes and concludes this study. Aircraft purchase has to be approved by CAAC, to ensure high industry utilization rates, which also makes it difficult for airlines to negotiate significant discounts by placing large orders. Li and Zheng (2008) concluded that 80% of the cost incurred by Chinese airlines was uncontrollable.
Background of Spring Airlines
Little was known about Spring's cost competitiveness until the airline released an IPO prospect document in 2014. Table 3 compares the unit operating costs of Spring to the "Big Three" airlines. Overall, Spring achieved unit operating costs 30-40% lower than major FSCs.
This remarkable leadership was achieved through several means: the airline used a fleet consisting of only A320 airplanes, which have an average age of 3.6 years and dense seat configurations. 6 The aircraft utilization rate is more than 11 hours per day, which is about 2 hours above the industry average. In addition, Spring's parent company, Spring Travel, is one of the largest travel agencies in the domestic market. As of late 2012, Spring Travel had 60 wholly-owned subsidiaries, managing a total of 4,000 travel agencies. This extensive network has given Spring an edge in ticket distribution. Spring is also the only carrier in China relying on an in-house ticketing system, independent of the GDS owned by TravelSky. TravelSky's reservation system monopolies the rest of the Chinese market for domestic travel. The inhouse system reduces Spring's distribution costs: the average cost of selling and marketing was 0.009 RMB/ASK (available seat kilometers) in 2013, substantially lower than the costs of other FSCs (Table 3 ). Spring's affiliation with its parent travel company also contributes to its ultra-high load factor, which averaged around 95% during 2005-2013. For an overview on the effects of fleet standardization on airline productivity, please refer to Zou et al. (2015) . 7 Bookings related to group travel contributed less than 20% of the total sales (number quoted by Spring's executives during an interview in 2012). This implies that the airline's ultra-high load factor is not entirely derived from packaged travel products sold by its parent company.
servants (9%) and private business owners (8%). These customers are usually highly educated, making it easier for Spring to introduce e-marketing and self-services (Spring Airlines, 2012).
Regulation in the domestic market, which might have prevented Spring from entering some profitable routes in large scale, could have also helped the carrier by restricting other airlines' entry into Shanghai. Fu et al. (2014) noted that in the Chinese domestic markets, route entry and airport slot allocations are monitored and/or regulated depending on whether hub airports are involved. The details of the regulations have evolved over the years. Before 2010, approvals for route entry were required for most large airports in provincial capital cities and metropolitan areas. Under the current rules, only entries involving the four airports in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (i.e. Beijing Capital Airport, Shanghai Hongqiao Airport, Shanghai
Pudong Airport, and Guangzhou Baiyun Airport) need to be approved. However, airlines that use these four airports as hubs/operational bases do not need to seek approval for flights from them to other destinations. Therefore, there is no need for Spring to seek approval for flight between Shanghai and Xi'an, but the carrier needs to seek approval for entering the route of or increasing frequency between Beijing and Shanghai. Airport slot allocation process is also ad hoc, although some guidelines have been given to slot allocation committees, which comprises representatives from the regional bureau, regional air traffic control, airlines, and the airport. Fu et al. (2014) concluded that the regulations on both route entry and airport slot allocation in China are more restrictive than those adopted in mature markets such as Europe and North America. Chinese airlines often need to secure approval for both route entry and airport slots when they enter into or add frequencies on routes linking to hubs in metropolitan areas.
In summary, there are both facilitators and impediments to LCC development in China, yet no study has examined these factors systematically. Therefore, a better understanding of the operation and competition strategy of Spring Airlines, the only successful LCC in China to date, would offer valuable insights into Spring Airlines, as well as into the Chinese aviation market in general. Such knowledge would facilitate the entry of other LCCs to the market and help policy makers to identify key factors which impede the Chinese aviation industry. In this study, this objective is achieved by empirically studying the pricing effects of Spring and analyzing the airline's route entry pattern.
Spring Airlines' Pricing Effects on FSCs
Many studies have examined the effects of LCCs on airline pricing. Windle and Dersner (1995) , Morrison and Winston (1995) and Morrison (2001) estimated reduced form fare equations and concluded that the presence of Southwest significantly reduced average prices on the routes. Another group of studies simultaneously estimated a fare equation and a demand function to identify parameters related to both passenger demand and supply (e.g. Richard, 1996 , Dresner et al., 1996 , Windle and Dresner, 1999 . The actual traffic volumes of each airline are unavailable in our study. As a result, only one reduced form fare equation can be estimated using exogenous variables related to route and airport characteristics. In addition, the fares of FSCs can be estimated using GDS reservation data, but price data for Spring are not available because the carrier uses its own reservation system. Therefore, we choose to examine the effects of Spring's presence on the fares of competing FSCs on the same route.
We use an econometric model similar to that of Morrison and Winston (1995) . The reduced form model is specified as in equation (1).
( , : Herfindahl Hirschman Index for route j in time t, computed based on airlines' scheduled seats on the route; ℎ , : product of an FSC's market shares (scheduled seats) in origin and destination (OD) airports of route j in time t;
, : product of OD airports' total traffic volumes (scheduled seats) for route j in time ;
: dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one airport on route j is a tourist destination. In our sample, tourist destinations include the following airports: Kunming, Guilin, Lijiang, Xi'an, Lhasa, Haikou, Sanya and Hailar; This reduced form fare equation is estimated with the dependent variable being the yield of the four largest Chinese FSCs respectively. These four airlines, namely state-owned Air China, China Eastern and China Southern (the "Big Three"), and the fourth largest carrier Hainan airlines, dominate the Chinese domestic market. Their pricing behavior should play important roles in setting the competition scenarios on a route and thus serve as good proxies for market fare levels. To control for possible airline-specific effects, the average yield of all four FSCs on a route is also tested as the dependent variable.
The explanatory variable of interest is the dummy variable
, , which is set to 1 if Spring operates on this route. Flying distance is included because yield usually decreases with stage length in a route. , controls for endpoint airport sizes on one route. It captures the market potential as geo-economic variables such as population and income level. The , index measures market concentration, which serves as a proxy for market competition at route level. It is expected that fares should be higher on more concentrated routes. ℎ , reflects the airline's presence at endpoint airports of a route. Intuitively, when airlines possess larger market shares in origin-destination (OD) airports, they are able to charge higher prices, a benefit similar to the "hub-premium" identified in previous studies (Borenstein, 1989) . During the past decade, high-speed rail (HSR) services had experienced tremendous growth. Although Fu et al. (2012) km, thus the fare reduction per route was US$7.7 (or RMB53) on average. This limited fare reduction may be explained by Spring's low capacity on individual routes. Although the carrier has been expanding its network and fleet, its capacity share on individual routes tends to be low, especially on dense routes dominated by large FSCs. As illustrated in Figure 3 , Spring's route capacity share is mostly below 20% for the dense routes. Therefore, dominant
FSCs are not under great pressure to respond with a significant price cut.
Indeed, to incumbent full service carriers HSR services impose much more significant competitive pressure than low cost carriers. According to the estimation results as reported in Flight frequency may have significant effects over an airline's yield because an increase in flight frequency improves a carrier's service quality through reducing passengers' schedule delay. However, carriers adjust their frequencies frequently in responding to demand shocks.
As such, including flight frequencies in reduced-form regressions raises endogeneity concern, as demonstrated in Fu et al. (2011) . FSC dummies in Eq (1) represent the carriers' entry decisions, which face significant fixed-costs and cannot therefore be adjusted frequently. Due to the endogeneity issue associated with flight frequencies, we use FSC dummies instead of their flight frequencies in Eq (1) but conduct a robustness check of replacing the FSC dummies with respective FSCs' frequencies. Estimation results of the robustness check, which are reported in the appendix, are similar to our baseline results.
Overall, our estimation results suggest that Spring adopts a "cream-skimming" strategy to selectively enter routes that are high-priced. This may allow Spring to achieve extremely high load factors without offering many deeply discounted tickets. Still, the presence of Spring on a route does impose some competitive pressure on FSCs, leading to moderate fare reductions.
This competition pattern is different from those observed in fully deregulated markets, in which LCCs such as Southwest enter routes and provide deep discounts and large capacities or large frequencies (see for example Dresner et al., 1996; Morrison, 2001; Fu et al., 2011) .
There is no clear justification for Spring, or any airline, to offer limited capacity on profitable routes. Instead, this is likely due to government regulation. Although route entry restriction has been removed for most destinations, there is regulation and effective slot control in major airports, especially those in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. By establishing its operational base in Shanghai, Spring is well positioned to enter some of the most profitable markets.
However, this also implies that the airline will have limited freedom in planning its network expansion and route entries. Another possible explanation is that it may be in Spring's own interests to limit its capacity on individual routes. The airline is a fringe player compared to other dominant FSCs which have large fleets and easy access to capital. Spring will benefit from avoiding price wars and deploying its limited capacity on the most profitable routes. In other words, it may be the airline's choice to adopt a "puppy dog" strategy at the current stage.
In the following section, we study Spring's entry decisions.
Route Entry Choice of Spring Airlines
To identify factors influencing an airline's route entry decisions, a discrete choice model can be estimated based on the observed network pattern of airlines (e.g. Boguslaski et al., 2004; Oliveira, 2008; Homsombat et al., 2014 ). An airline's decision to serve an airport-pair or not depends on the profit generated from this route market. Although the entry decision of Spring can be identified, the airline's operating profit on each route is unobservable (latent) to researchers. Consider Spring's latent profit * after entering a route to be the following equation (2) (2) ln * = ′ + which is a function of a vector of control variables ′ and a stochastic error term . More specifically, the profit function (2) can be specified as the following expression China and China Southern, which are based in these two airports, respectively. It may be difficult for Spring to acquire slots or to compete with other airlines' fortress hubs (Borenstein, 1989; Zhang, 1996) . The dummy variable , is included to control possible effects of HSR competition on Spring's route entry decisions.
Let Spring's entry decision be and be the fixed cost or a profit threshold for Spring to enter a new route (i.e., the minimum profit required for the airline to enter a route, or the opportunity costs associated with a new market entry). The entry decision can be specified as a function of the latent profit function (3) Table 6 .
The probit model estimation results are displayed in Table 7 , which are based on the specification of HSR1. Using alternative specification of HSR2 yields similar results, which are not reported to save space. The coefficient of flying distance is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that Spring is likely to enter long distance routes. This is different from established LCCs such as Southwest, which prefer short haul routes. In our sample, the average stage length for routes served by Spring is 1,248 kilometers, longer than the sample mean of 1,045 kilometers. Intuitively, this might be due to the competition from HSR services, because HSR services often have a significant advantage over air transport in terms of frequency and cost on medium and short haul routes (Fu et al., 2012 . However, whereas HSR dummy is significant in FSAs' yield estimation, it does not have a significant effect on Spring's route entry decisions. Overall, it seems that Spring's entry decision is not significantly affected by competition, either from full service airlines or HSR services. Spring is likely to enter into many more routes when the domestic market is fully deregulated. The estimation results also revealed that competition on a route is not an impedimentary factor for Spring, as evidenced by the positive but not significant coefficient of the HHI index. A closer look at the detailed entry pattern reveals that Spring has entered some dense routes in the presence of multiple competing airlines. The carrier has also initiated some new routes which had not been served by any airline before. As the pricing study in the previous section suggests, Spring has selectively entered some dense routes which are high-priced. Meanwhile, as the carrier has significantly lower costs than other FSCs, it can serve some very thin routes that are not feasible for high cost FSCs. Although traffic volumes on these routes are limited, Spring may still be able to achieve decent levels of profit with its monopoly status. As a result, Spring has entered routes with both high and low market concentration ratios.
The density dummies 1 and 2 are significantly positive, indicating that Spring prefers dense routes. However, it is not easy for the carrier to enter the largest routes, such as the top 20 markets. After six-years' preparation and application, Spring finally obtained the approval to serve the Shanghai -Beijing route in 2011, the same year when a high speed rail linking the two cities was put into operation. Table 8 The positive sign of suggests that Spring prefers to add routes that operate out of its base at Shanghai. This is intuitive, because adding new services from established bases is cost effective, as it allows a carrier to better use the existing infrastructure. In addition, scheduling more flights at base airports helps Spring to maximize aircraft utilization, because aircraft can be conveniently transferred between routes in case of service disruptions. Spring's daily aircraft utilization is more than 11 hours, which is about 30% higher than the industry average. Finally, Spring avoids operating in Guangzhou and Beijing, which are the hubs of China Southern and Air China. As competition (measured by HHI index) does not appear to have any effect on Spring's entry decision, this avoidance is probably due to difficulties in obtaining slots and governmental approval in these two airports.
Conclusion
Despite the phenomenal growth of the Chinese aviation industry over the past decades, the country's LCC sector is still under-developed. By early 2013, there was only one LCC serving the market, which controlled a negligible share of the domestic market. However, Spring has achieved rapid growth in traffic volume and revenue, as well as consistent profitability, since its inauguration in 2005. There has been no convincing explanation for the success of Spring Airlines despite the under-development of the LCC market. In fact, few empirical investigations have analyzed the LCC sector in China. This study fills this research gap by examining the competition effects brought by Spring to the Chinese domestic market and the carrier's route entry strategy.
Our empirical results suggest that Spring adopts a "cream skimming" strategy to enter highpriced routes, allowing the carrier to achieve both a very high load factor and considerable profitability. Spring's capacity and market shares on individual routes are constrained to low levels, which is likely due to government regulation on route entry and airport slot acquisition, and/or a "puppy dog" strategy adopted by the carrier. As a result, Spring is able to achieve fast growth without triggering price wars with incumbent FSCs. Overall, the carrier has moderately increased competition on the routes, on average reducing the fare of Air China by 5.1%, the fare of China Eastern by 3.4% and the fare of Hainan Airlines by 6.2%. Similar to LCCs in developed markets, Spring prefers to serve dense markets and routes that operate out of its operational base in Shanghai, Overall, it seems that Spring's entry decision is not significantly affected by competition, either from full service airlines or HSR services.
Therefore, Spring's limited services at major airports such as Beijing and Guangzhou are likely due to regulation instead of competition concerns. Spring is likely to enter into many more routes when the domestic market is fully deregulated. LCCs that may target the same market segment as Spring. 9 In addition, as discussed in previous sections, Spring has some unique competitive advantages which cannot be easily replicated by other LCCs (e.g., Spring's parent company is one of the largest travel agents in China, and its operation is based in Shanghai). However, for the development of the aviation industry as a whole, more LCCs need to be formed and further deregulation is needed. This may include the deregulation of aircraft purchase and pilot recruitment, introducing a transparent system of slot allocation at hub airports and allowing LCCs into more international markets.
Although our empirical investigation offers fresh insights into an important market, our study has some limitations. Due to data limitations, we are unable to observe the actual traffic volume of each airline, and thus use scheduled capacities (number of seats) as proxy variables.
For the same reason, we cannot estimate a demand function and a fare equation simultaneously, which would have increased estimation efficiency and offered richer information on passenger preferences. In addition, as Spring uses its own reservation system, its fares are not publically available. Although our investigation of competing FSCs' fare changes reveals Spring's competitive effects on rival airlines, it does not allow a direct examination of Spring's pricing Notes: (1) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; (2) The number in brackets is the standard error; (3) Quarterly and yearly dummy variables are included in the estimation but are not reported to conserve space. We have also tested alternative specifications with monthly dummies (instead of quarterly dummies), which led to no qualitative changes in the estimation; (4) Distance and tourist are time invariant variables, hence cannot be estimated by the fixed effect model. Note: * significant at 10% level;** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The number in brackets is the standard error. 
